The Fast Lane to Europe

Kirsi Martikainen:

CIVIL MOVEMENTS SLOW TO REACT

CONTENTS

Finns placed their trust in opinion-leaders and media

In Finland, the popular debate on Europe was slow to get going. Even political and business leaders were cautious in their pronouncements on Finland's relationship with European integration as late as the autumn preceding the country's application for EC membership. In fact, popular movements both for and against EU membership became increasingly vocal only during the referendum campaign itself, while the general public seemed happy to rely on the views of recognized opinion-leaders and the media.

In spring 1989, Paavo Lipponen (Social Democratic Party, SDP), who was then director of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, judged that Finnish EC membership would become a live issue in the 1990s. In the same year, the most active supporters of Finnish membership, led by the writer Lasse Lehtinen (SDP), founded the Euroklubi (Euroclub), a discussion forum for key public figures, while a critical view of Finnish EC membership was provided by Eurooppa-toimikunta - a `red-green' committee founded in 1988 and led by Erkki Tuomioja, Deputy Mayor of Helsinki

In June 1991, Sweden's decision to apply for membership caused Finland to reconsider its own position. At its annual party conference, the National Coalition Party had already supported the launch of simultaneous EC membership negotiations along with Austria and Sweden. Later that same year, the Party Council of the Social Democratic Party announced its support for Finland's EC membership.

The first to mobilize were groups opposed to Finnish membership. Vaihtoehto EY:lle (Alternative to the EC), founded in September 1991, grew into the largest and most widespread movement opposing membership. Its members included a broad spectrum of activists from alternative movements and members of various political parties.

At this stage the supporters of EC membership were still rather unorganized, as it was thought that active support would damage the chances for success. There was a wish to see the EEA negotiations begun in 1990 concluded first. However, preliminary discussions among industry and trade unions led to the founding of the organization Eurooppalainen Suomi (European Movement in Finland) in November 1993. This took the view that the Government needed help in defending EC membership, largely because the Prime Minister's own Centre Party had no definite position on the issue.

To boost its credibility, Eurooppalainen Suomi sought the support of prominent Finns. In fact, it was able to recruit supporters from all the major parties across the political spectrum. `Elder statesmen' were perhaps over-represented, and the organization's marked need to be taken seriously admittedly gave the impression that it was old-fashioned and autocratic.

Referendum spurred activity

The high point for both supporters and opponents of EC membership was March 1994, when the membership negotiations were brought to a conclusion and the Government decided to organize a consultative referendum in October of the same year. However, the tight timetable weakened both sides, affecting their organization and planning.

In preparation for the referendum, Eurooppalainen Suomi added the epithet Parempi vaihtoehto (The better alternative) to its title and commissioned an in-depth survey to focus its campaign themes and identify its target groups. The themes which emerged were employment, upholding the welfare state, the position of women and gender equality, the environment, national security, cultural links with the West and coop-eration with Russia, food prices and the future of young people. The target groups were those thought to be undecided on the issue of membership, such as women working in the public service sector, pensioners, the unemployed and young people. In regional terms, the campaign focused on densely populated areas.

In March, Eurooppalainen Suomi opened a campaign office and established 17 regional committees. A nationwide network was set up in co-operation with other organizations supporting EU membership. The regional committees were responsible for establishing local committees, creating a regional network of experts, exchange of speakers, organizing information outlets at large summer events, handling contacts with the media and arranging public events.

According to the organization's own assessment, regional committees played a crucial role in the campaign, and the overall network of about 100 local committees helped the campaign reach the general public.

The campaign office printed free material and used its network to distribute pro-EC material from other organizations. Promotion material was also produced for sale, but response was minimal. The advertising campaign, which took over 50% of the organization's national budget, focused on newspaper and television ads, as well as ads at Helsinki metro stations.

Eurooppalainen Suomi tried to influence public opinion through the media. Politicians received more national media coverage than the civil movements, but the extensively networked `yes' campaign was also able to use this level in a co-ordinated way. Regional and local operations strove to inform citizens at grassroots level on the effects of membership and non-membership. Advertising was aimed at both levels. Equally significant were the various types of work behind the scenes, such as influencing and coaching speakers for television broadcasts.

The `yes' campaign's objective was to distance itself from the traditional `government/opposition' mindset with a separate campaign organization. As there were both opponents and supporters on both sides of the political divide, an undue stress on party affiliations would have left no room for defending membership. The broad support enjoyed by regional committees and local groups helped crystallize the pro/con character of the debate.

The Parempi vaihtoehto - Eurooppalainen Suomi movement also set up a separate women's forum. Young people and students had their own organization, Kyllä Euroopalle (Yes to Europe), which functioned independently but co-ordinated its operations with Eurooppalainen Suomi.

Opponents wanted to consolidate their forces

In spring 1994, the `no' side also regrouped. The umbrella organization, Itsenäinen Suomi - paras vaihtoehto (Independent Finland - the best alternative), was smaller than expected. In addition to the VEU (Vaihtoehto EU:lle - Alternative to the EU), the other members were the rather small discussion forum, Suomen Itsenäissyyseura (Finnish Independence Society); the SDP caucus Itsenäinen kansa - yhteistyön maailma (An Independent People - A Cooperating World); and newspaper editor Keijo Korhonen's presidential campaign organization, Suomen kansan Itsenäisyysrintama (The Finnish People's Independence Front). The campaign office Ei EU:lle kampanjatoimisto (No to Europe Campaign Office) was in charge of the actual campaign.

Fourteen opposition groups were eventually to participate in the joint campaign. Except for the VEU, the opposition comprised small single-issue movements: young people and wage earners had their own groups, as did the Kyllä maailmalle - ei EU:lle (Yes to the world - No to the EU) movement for supporters of developing countries. Many `no' campaign activists were seasoned veterans of peace, solidarity and other alternative movements, with experience in political parties and anti-EEC campaigns during the 70s.

The central themes of the united `no' campaign were democracy and self-determination, defence of the welfare state and national security. On the other hand, it ignored the issue of agriculture. According to the activists, this had already received its fair share of publicity, while the MTK (the Central Union of Agricultural Producers and Forest Owners) was able to apply its considerable resources to ensuring that the voice of farmers was heard in the preparations for EU membership.

The `no' movement strongly criticized the date set for the referendum. They argued that it was just political tactics to time the referenda in such a way that allowed the countries with the least resistance to membership according to opinion polls to vote first. The final order was Austria, followed by Finland, Sweden, and finally Norway.

The campaign office was founded in June 1994, with information outlets set up in Tampere and Turku. The VEU and its activists were responsible for field operations. It had 4,000-5,000 individual members across the country; no other campaign group could boast a similar organization.

Operations focused on southern Finland and the large urban centres. The campaign was most successful in the countryside and regions, however. According to the `no' campaign, the press's favourable stance on EU membership was partly to blame for the campaign's problems in the Helsinki metropolitan area and the larger cities.

In addition to events organized across Finland, a campaign bus toured the Helsinki metropolitan area from the beginning of September 1994. A mock referendum arranged that autumn at schools provided an opportunity for participation in hundreds of different debates. Along with magazines and other publications, balloons, pins, fliers, shirts and hats were also produced. TV and outdoor advertising was used in the last few weeks before the referendum.

The opposition was well-connected internationally, especially with other Nordic countries. It also formed contacts with the critical Europe of Nations group functioning within the European Parliament.

After a breather, the IGC and EMU

Once Finland became a member of the EU, pro-EU groups considered it best to pause for a while, even though continued debate on Europe was considered necessary. The time was ripe for dismantling the campaign structure and placing operations on a more permanent footing.

In 1996, the Eurooppalainen Suomi movement became active once more, but without the epithet `A Better Alternative'. Its new objective was to promote public debate on the EU and its development, increase EU awareness, activate people to vote in the upcoming European elections and provide experts for the shaping of Finland's EU policy.

The emphasis at this stage was on the October 1996 European elections and the themes set for the Intergovernmental Conference. The most visible activity was the Eurobus, which visited 99 localities prior to the EP elections, offering information on Europe and a chance to meet EP candidates. Panel discussions and other public events were also organized along the route.

The organization hoped to raise voter turnout to 70%. In the event, the turnout was only 60% - less than the rate predicted by the voter intention surveys commissioned by the organization.

Eurooppalainen Suomi continues to publish EU-related material and monitor changes in public opinion by commissioning gallups on EMU. The euro took centre stage when the Tulevaisuuden Eurooppa (Future Europe) tour visited dozens of events in the summer and autumn of 1997.

The organization has also continued to recruit members, although individuals have not yet contributed very much.

Even before Finnish accession, Eurooppalainen Suomi sought to co-operate with the international European Movement, while closer co-operation has also evolved with similar organizations in Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany and Ireland.

Opposition did not end with the referendum

Most small groups opposed to Finnish membership dissolved once the referendum was lost and it became clear that membership would gain a majority in the Finnish Parliament. The final blow was delivered by the referenda in Sweden and Norway. However, the oldest and best-established nationwide group opposed to membership, the VEU, continued to operate even after membership became effective. The movement's central goal has been to participate in public debate by communicating their critical views on the IGC and the EU - e.g. in 1996 the VEU produced about 80 press releases. The movement has also continued to publish its own material, produce a paper and organize events.

In 1996, the VEU put up ten candidates for the EP election. Before announcing its candidates, there was a vigorous debate over whether a movement opposed to the EU should participate at all. The winning side based their position on experiences in Denmark, where initially critical party members had ultimately toed the party line.

Listed candidates came from almost all the major parties. However, VEU support suffered a setback when members of the Left-Wing Alliance decided to stand in the election on their own party lists. The VEU felt that registered parties were placed at an advantage because it had to collect 4,000 signatures for each of its candidates. Profile-raising was also difficult as VEU support came under the motley rubric `others' in the gallup polls. Not a single VEU candidate was elected to join the 16 new Finnish MEPs. The candidate list gained 2.1% of votes cast.

Funding of the movements

Grants from the Prime Minister's Office for information provision on integration formed a considerable resource for both pro- and anti-EU movements. For example, around 75% of Itsenäinen Suomi - paras vaihtehto's (Independent Finland - The Best Alternative) joint campaign costs (FIM 3.9 million) were covered by government grants, as were about 40% of Parempi vaihtoehto's (The Better Alternative) costs (FIM 6.6 million) in the year the referendum was held.

Campaign activities tended to be structured to match the application periods for government grants, which arguably hampered long-term campaign work. On the other hand, State funding allowed many traditional non-governmental organizations to participate in the EU debate. Consumer organizations as well as organizations in the social and health sector also provided their own EU information. Likewise, educational organizations were a key tool in providing information on EU integration - at least to their members, who in most cases were affiliate organizations of the political parties.

Just before the referendum, State aid was divided into three groups, for pro, anti and neutral information. However, it was not so easy to determine what constituted `neutral' information. An unsuccessful complaint was filed with the Chancellor of Justice concerning the `neutrality' of KEY (Keskusjärjestöjen Eurooppa-yhteistyö - Europe Co-operation for Trade Union Confederations). Also, the MTK, actively against EU membership on a grassroots level, received State aid for distributing neutral information.

Fundraising was of course easier for the pro-EU side, which enjoyed the support of Finnish business and industry. The anti-EU movement was supported by the MTK, especially in the beginning, and later by individual producer organizations. The VEU's EP campaign received support from the European Parliament's Europe of Nations group in the form of a grant, which was later converted into a loan. The European Commission also supports the information efforts of Eurooppalainen Suomi and other pro-EU organizations. Both sides received financial support from the trade unions, while the anti-EU side made greater use of public collections.

Interest groups as a background force

Since the late 80s, EU-related questions have been on the agenda of Finnish business and industrial organizations. Especially active in information dissemination, carrying out surveys and providing training have been the Central Chamber of Commerce, the Centre for Finnish Business and Policy Studies and the Bureau for Economic Information. The working group for business and industrial integration also maintained close ties with similar Nordic organizations.

Unlike Sweden, top-ranking Finnish business leaders did not openly support EC membership, though a Central Chamber of Commerce delegation had already called for EC membership in 1990. The industrial sector began to support membership actively only after the 1991 devaluation of the Finnish markka and the conclusion of the EEA negotiations in February 1992.

The food industry had its own pro-EU campaign during the membership negotiations. Independent of basic agricultural production, the food industry distanced itself from its old partners, the farmers seeking a transitional period. The major exporters founded Elintarvikeryhmä-93 (Foodstuff group 93), which demanded an immediate shift to Common Market prices. They claimed that this would cut food costs by 20%, a figure contested by the MTK.

The trade unions were also eager to climb on the European bandwagon at an early stage. TEPE, an organization for European co-operation between Finnish industrial unions belonging to the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), the Confederation of Technical Employee Organizations in Finland (STTK) and the Confederation of Salaried Employee Organizations in Finland (TVK), was set up in 1989 as a result of contacts with similar organizations for trade union co-operation and with their representation in Brussels. This initiative arose from the need to explain the impact of the Common Market on Finnish industry. TEPE's role was to be information dissemination, training and strategy. Early 1991 saw the founding of KEY, a joint body for the trade union confederations.

KEY's initial role was to provide employees with information. Concerning EU strategy, KEY was more political in outlook than TEPE. During the EEA negotiations, it distributed information on the negotiations and co-ordinated trade union views. During Finland's membership negotiations, organization members began to receive more and more information through publications and events. Separate events were arranged for female employees.

KEY and the trade union confederations adopted a low profile during the referendum campaign. They did not take sides, but did encourage members to vote. Interestingly, the SAK had already pushed for EC membership application in November 1991.

However, many central organization leaders personally supported EU membership, especially after Sweden had submitted its membership application, while supporters of anti-EU movements were convinced KEY was actually an advocate of membership, although it had in fact tried to focus also on possible problems resulting from membership. March 1994 saw the founding of Palkansaajien kriittinen EU-foorumi (Critical EU forum for employees), which became an information network of a few hundred people. In addition to publishing, the forum provided employee events with die-hard EU critics. Funding came from contributions from local trade unions and individuals, and State aid channelled through the VEU.

The MTK was the interest group most opposed to EU membership, with its long-lasting position of `no, unless'. The MTK's goal was to safeguard the future of agriculture in Finland by winning compensation for Finland's northern location and climate. Six weeks before the referendum, the MTK decided at its annual congress to oppose EU membership outright, as it was dissatisfied with the guarantees in the Finnish Treaty of Accession and related decisions at a national level.

The response from Finnish farmers was unexpectedly strong. In February 1994, during the final leg of membership negotiations, groups within the MTK in southern Finland demonstrated outside the European Commission Representation in Finland, burning a torn EU flag and carting snow from `zero-support fields' to the centre of Helsinki. Protesters also carried slogans such as `Kill Hayes' (head of the Commission's Delegation in Finland). The MTK later received a bill for removal of the snow.

Parties marched to their own drummer

The Coalition Party and the SDP were the least divided by the EU question. The Coalition Party's policy concerning EU integration enjoyed unanimous support among party members. It was also the first party to respond in public to the membership issue. In August 1990, a pro-EC membership speech made by the Chairman of the Coalition Party, Ilkka Suominen, was flatly rejected by other more cautious Cabinet members and President Koivisto. At its summer conference in 1991, the Coalition Party adopted a thoroughgoing and unreservedly positive position on the implications of EC membership.

In contrast, Paavo Lipponen, who had failed to become SDP Chairman in 1990, had to work hard to get his fellow party members to back EC membership. In autumn 1991, however, the Party Council decided in favour. In fact, SDP Chairman Pertti Paasio, who had been Foreign Minister in the previous Government, had already advised Finns to prepare to apply for EC membership in the spring following the parliamentary elections which had placed the SDP in opposition.

The integration debate within the SDP did not lack voices raised in dissent. In autumn 1993, a group opposing EU membership founded an organization called Itsenäinen kansa - yhteistyön maailma (Independent nation - co-operative world), which was based on party conference platforms from the 50s. The society's agenda covered employment, neutrality and democracy. Economic and Monetary Union was also a topic before the referendum. Furthermore, the society attempted to remind party members opposed to agricultural subsidies that agriculture would continue to be subsidized in the EU. The society ceased to operate after the referendum.

Meanwhile, the Left-Wing Alliance asked its members for their views on EC membership before the membership application was submitted. Two-thirds of the respondents were more or less opposed to membership. The Left-Wing Alliance had no set position before the referendum and the Parliament's decision on accession, and prior to the referendum included groups from both camps; i.e. Eurooppalainen vasemmisto (European Left) and Vasemmiston ei EU:lle (The Left's No to the EU).

The Centre Party leadership, including then Prime Minister Esko Aho, were for long hesitant over EC membership. In early 1991, the Centre Party expressed its interest in participating in the EC membership debate, but it was the following year before Aho publicly supported membership. In fact, Aho and Paavo Väyrynen, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, were hard-pressed to obtain support from reluctant party members prior to the Government's decision to submit Finland's membership application.

The Centre Party's main concern was agriculture and regional development, and its official policy focused on regional exemptions and support measures. Along with the non-committed, the party contained both hard-core EU opponents and a handful of supporters. The former included the Vastuu Suomesta (Responsibility for Finland) group founded by Paavo Väyrynen, who had resigned from his position as Foreign Minister to concentrate on his presidential campaign. At the spring 1994 party conference preceding the referendum, Aho was able to obtain moderate support for EU membership only by threatening to resign.

For politicians, the Eurooppa-toimikunta (Europe committee) acted as a preparatory school for EU membership, consequently influencing political debate within the parties as well. Initially hostile to EU integration, the committee and its members eventually supported EU membership.

Commission avoids campaigning

In early 1993, the EC had opened a delegation in Helsinki. Eric Hayes, former head of the Commission's EFTA Unit, was appointed Ambassador to Finland. He was able to use his knowledge of Finland effectively during the negotiations. While not a member of the negotiations delegation, Hayes actively strove to increase understanding on both sides of the membership debate.

The EU office avoided campaigning for EU membership or interfering in national decision-making during the membership negotiations and before the decision on accession. The message was that Finland was welcome to join the EU - if it so decided. Hayes' public appearances were designed to give the EU a `human face', while active information and publishing sought to furnish as much information as possible for the decision-making process.

The office naturally maintained close contact with pro-EU groups in Finland, particularly with representatives of industry and the central employer and employee organizations. After all, the European movement was slow to get going in Finland. In addition, the crucial importance of agriculture was evidenced by the Commission's close contacts with the MTK and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

Since accession, the Commission's information services have been able to be more political in nature. The Commission naturally seeks the support of both interest groups and the general public for its initiatives. On the other hand, it uses its Representation in the Member States to monitor the political climate and public opinion. Financial assistance is granted to organizations and authorities which provide information on the EU. One major change brought by membership was the question of language: with one exception, all posts in the Commission's Finnish quota became occupied by Finns during the first year of membership.

On Finland's accession, the European Parliament opened an information office in Helsinki. This provides information on the work, members and decisions of the European Parliament to schools, researchers, authorities, organizations and the media. MEPs and party groups are largely responsible for their own PR work and contacts.

Finland's largest ever public information project

During the run-up to EU membership there was a lot of talk about a `new political culture', mobile voters, permeable forums for public debate and civic spirit. In the wake of accession, the opportunity for new forms of public debate remains.

Likewise, new alliances were formed within the public administration, industrial circles and organizations. Finnish business and industry had entertained the idea of EU membership since the 80s. In the end, the pro-EU movements were able to iron out their differences and present a united front.

The civil movements, despite their massive efforts, proved unable to reach large sections of the population. According to a gallup poll, only 5-10% of the populace obtained information on the EU through one of the pro-EU or anti-EU organizations. Campaigns on both sides suffered from the tight timetable and the delay in completing the negotiations.

The run-up to the referendum also stressed the role of the media as an information source. When it comes to sheer volume, no single event in Finnish history has received as much publicity as the process leading to EU membership.

SOURCES:

Pertti Pesonen (ed.): Suomen EU-kansanäänestys. Raportti äänestäjien kannanotoista. Painatuskeskus Oy 1994.

Ullamaija Kivikuru (ed.): Kansa euromyllyssä. Yliopistopaino 1996.

Annual reports of non-governmental organizations.

Interviews with representatives from organizations and movements participating in the EU debate.

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