The Fast Lane to Europe

Pasi Natri:

EU REFERENDUM - A CHALLENGE FOR THE STATE ADMINISTRATION

CONTENTS

• Finland Information on European Integration in 1993-1994
• Finland lacks a tradition of referenda
• State administration supplements the work of the media
• Influence on voting behaviour
• Government aims
• Basic aims: equality and comprehensiveness
• A decentralized model
• Information resources
• Methods of operation
• Marketing efforts and the demand for services
• An impartial approach
• What was achieved?
• The referendum ensured public acceptance of the decision

Finland Information on European Integration in 1993-1994

The prelude to the referendum on EU membership saw the Finnish Government implementing its largest single public information campaign to date. The aim was to provide the general public with a broad range of information to use in deciding which way to vote in the referendum. There was certainly a profusion of information and opinion on offer, and the referendum bound the general public more firmly to the decision on membership than the normal process of political decision-making would have done.

Finnish democracy has always been representative in nature, with both local and central government being exercised by popularly elected organs. In recent years there has been a slight break in the continuity of this tradition: legislation has been passed on the holding of referenda, while the President of the Republic is nowadays chosen by direct popular election.

Finland lacks a tradition of referenda

A law governing the holding of referenda was added to the constitution in 1987. As only one referendum had been held prior to this date (in 1931), there was a distinct lack of experience to draw on in drafting the law. Flexibility was thus needed when the provisions came to be applied in practice. The special law passed on the EU referendum did not allow the voter the option of declaring lack of support for both of the alternatives proposed, although the right to such an option had been included in the 1987 law. The constitutional rules governing the provision of information in the run-up to a referendum were also rather unsuited to the practical situation of campaigning and voting.

In a referendum, the people are not just the source of State power, but also an actual organ of government. In addition to serving the public, the role of the State administration also extends to assisting the decision-making process, which at national level normally means providing the Government and Parliament with back-up. In the State administration's information provision for the referendum, this role became focused directly on the general public, seen here in the role of public decision-makers.

The EU referendum created a new relationship between the State administration and the general public in its role as decision-maker, a relationship which created initial difficulties for both sides. Those sectors of central government with no experience of daily contact with the general public found it hard to adapt to the extensive demand for information. The State administration's information practices had been tailored mainly to the needs of the mass media and interest groups, although obvious exceptions include organizations like the tax authorities, whose main function lies precisely in serving the general public.

The vast majority of citizens only come into contact with the State in relation to their own private affairs. In addition to the media, information is normally distributed by educational and cultural bodies such as the schools and libraries. Against this background, it was understandable that the Finnish public found it somewhat odd for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to go walkabout in the streets.

The State administration had no experience of organizing a referendum or managing the provision of information for it. The media, political parties, interest groups, non-governmental organizations and educational institutions were equally unprepared for a situation in which ordinary citizens had to decide on a question of great national importance.

State administration supplements the work of the media

In a modern, highly diversified society the main responsibility for the provision of information lies with the mass media. So why was there a need for the government to distribute information directly to the public?

The media in general certainly responded in exemplary fashion to the public need for information on the EU. It would have been possible to become an expert on the EU purely by carefully following the daily flow of news on the subject.

Direct information provision by the government served two aims. One was to furnish original data to providers of information such as the media, government agencies and NGOs, while the other was to provide voters with information which would not readily lend itself to the column space or time schedules of the mass media, either because of its scope or due to the small sector of the public at which it was aimed.

Public information provision was thus not intended to be an alternative to the mass media or the work of other information providers, but rather a complementary service which proved very well-suited to the question of EU membership. Similar direct information was also provided in the other countries joining the EU at the same time as Finland.

Influence on voting behaviour

Of course, information always has an effect on its recipients. Information provision related to the EU referendum must therefore also be examined in terms of the influence different actors had on actual voting behaviour. The main players in the provision of information were political leaders, the media, NGOs and the State administration itself.

In a complex decision with implications for society as a whole, it is to be expected that the leaders of political opinion will play a prominent role as ordinary members of the public make up their minds. Figures influencing public opinion in this way include the most important politicians and leaders of interest groups, and to a certain extent also artists, academics and even celebrities.

The second most important player was the mass media. The general effect of the media was to reduce the popularity of EU membership, despite the fact that most of the media were at least covertly in favour of membership. The explanation lies in the nature of campaigning and media behaviour. The existence of only two alternatives enforces an impartiality unrelated to actual reality, while bad news is generally more interesting than good. Moreover, with the factual information distributed by the Government often being seen as biased in favour of membership, there was often a perceived need for media coverage to be slanted very strongly in the opposite direction.

The popular campaigns in Finland were less significant than those in Sweden and Norway, while in Austria the political parties played a more important role than their Scandinavian counterparts. The whole question of EU membership was so new in Finland that the popular campaigns had no time to establish themselves as important players in the debate. Finland had had no real prior experience of political activity across traditional social boundaries and uniting people from different sectors of society. The large number of NGOs in Finland has always tended to hamper the emergence of broadly-based social movements outside the political parties.

The parties themselves took little part in campaigning. With the single exception of the National Coalition Party, the referendum caused internal divisions in all the major parties. The idea would also seem to have emerged that the general unpopularity of the political parties made them a poor vehicle for getting the message across. They also lacked the financial resources for major campaigning.

The Government thus took on an exceptionally important - if somewhat contradictory - role in relation to the referendum. This was no doubt due to the complexity of the EU membership issue, which led to the emphasis being placed on knowledge rather than opinion. The Government's role was also heightened by its strength, compared to that of many of the other protagonists.

Government aims

The Government approached the provision of information from two angles at once. On the one hand, it was the duty of the public administration to provide information on EU membership that would be as factual, as comprehensive and as impartial as possible, while against this it was also the duty of the State administration to implement Government policy, which aimed at membership. Considering the circumstances, these at times conflicting functions were fairly successfully fulfilled.

At a meeting of its EC ministerial group in January 1993, the Government discussed the "provision of information on integration". The proposal approved at this meeting stated that the general public had the right to expect a comprehensive range of information on the practical implications of integration. Any problems related to decisions taken were also to be brought out into the open. The provision of information by the Government was not intended to shape public opinion, but to provide information to facilitate public debate.

The proposal approved by the EC ministerial group included an appendix defining the basic nature of the public information service (later to become Finland Information on European Integration). This stated that the service was to provide the public with a broad spectrum of information on integration and to operate as a channel through which members of the public could request the information they wanted.

The most important goal of the State EU information service was to serve the public in their role as decision-makers. If society requires its members to express a view on a common issue such as EU membership, it should also provide information on which the decision can be based. It is also possible to isolate two secondary aims: to increase the Finnish public's readiness for the process of internationalization and to deepen the processes of democracy in the country.

If we are to continue to build our prosperity on international trade, we will need to increase our grasp of the knowledge and skills required in the global arena. This would still have been essential even had Finland not joined the European Union. On the other hand, the successful implementation of a referendum will in general require a nation to have matured as a democracy, while a successful referendum with all the activities related to it will correspondingly further the process towards democratic maturity.

Basic aims: equality and comprehensiveness

The public information service was designed to serve the needs of the Finnish public, interest groups and interested foreign parties. The structure was designed to provide equality of service to all. Much stress was thus placed on activities at a regional level.

At the time of the membership negotiations, it was already important to make contact with interest groups so that the needs of various interests in society could be taken into account in the negotiations. Cooperation with interest groups was essential to the successful communication of information. The interest groups relevant here can be defined as the media, the public administration, NGOs, educational institutions and workplaces.

Important aims can be promoted by providing foreign decision-makers with information on Finnish standpoints, although in practice this played only a marginal role in the work of the public EU information service. Apart from a few fairly small special projects, foreign information provision was restricted to normal interaction with governments, political parties, interest groups and journalists.

Referendum voters decided how to vote on the basis of information and value judgements. The role of government was to provide the information. A simultaneous effort was nevertheless also made to ensure that public debate was extensive enough to integrate individual details into meaningful structures. This was why the administration also supported the communication of ideological perspectives and the conduct of public debate.

A decentralized model

In Finland, the Government EU information was produced by an effort of society as a whole. There were over 30 committees and working groups established by the EC ministerial group, their membership including representatives from the political parties, interest groups and academic organizations.

The EU information effort was also dispersed across a number of administrative areas. The basic aim was that each organization within government would be responsible for providing information on its own EU-related work. An example of this was the information for agricultural producers produced by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. This decentralized model is to be continued in the future: EU matters are to form a routine part of normal working procedures.

Four organizations within government played an especially visible role in the provision of EU information. The Department for External Economic Relations at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs assisted the negotiation delegation and shouldered the main responsibility for information content and the provision of material for daily news bulletins. Within the same Ministry, the Department for Press and Culture took responsibility for informing the general public. In addition to their overall responsibility for government information output, the Prime Minister's Office and the Information Unit of the Council of State were put in charge of distributing aid to non-governmental organizations. The Ministry of Justice was responsible for providing technical information related to the referendum.

Government information activities were coordinated by the EU Information Group led by Secretary of State Veli Sundbäck from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. A number of other organizations were also active in providing information aimed at either a specific field or a target group. These included The Finnish Foreign Trade Association's Euro Info Centre, which provided information for business enterprises; the Finnish Standards Association, which informed the public about standards; and the Europe Project of social and health care organizations, which provided the social sector with information.

Information resources

The State budget for 1993-1994 included a total appropriation of FIM 30.6 million for the provision of information on the EU. These funds were distributed as follows:

• FIM 1.5 million to the Department for External Economic Relations at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
• FIM 8.8 million to the Department for Press and Culture of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
• FIM 5.6 million in special publication funds for the Ministry for Foreign AffairsFIM 14.7 million in aid to NGOs

These figures do not include the referendum information expenses of the Ministry of Justice. Only FIM 0.8 million of the above-mentioned funds were used to cover wages and salaries. Other government pay costs were covered either by the appropriations for permanent staff or out of employment funds. Pay costs totalling FIM 7.5 million for staff working full-time on EU information during 1993-1994 are not included in the above figures.

The Prime Minister's Office awarded State aid to non-governmental organizations and other corporate bodies engaged in EU information work on four separate occasions:

The most recent distribution of grants complied with the provisions on the holding of referenda in the Constitution Act of Finland (Section 22a), which state that it is the responsibility of the government to inform the public on the alternatives, and to support the dissemination of information. The distribution provides a good illustration of the principles followed generally in the distribution of funds. Thus, the `yes' camp received FIM 3,650,000, the `no' camp FIM 3,650,000, and parties describing themselves as neutral FIM 2,700,000.

Less funds were allocated for the provision of EU information in Finland than in Sweden, Norway and Austria. State support for information provision in Sweden to talled SEK 181 million (approximately FIM 130 million), while allocations in Norway and Austria were around twice the Finnish level.

Considering the social importance of the issue, therefore, EU information was rather poorly resourced.

Methods of operation

Finland Information on European Integration, a unit of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs' Department for Press and Culture, was set up at the beginning of February 1993. The unit was initially intended to operate until 1994, but its operations were extended following the referendum under the name Europe Information.

The unit's first office opened in June 1993, in the New Student House, Helsinki. Between January and April 1994 an information office was also opened in every regional centre throughout the country. The opening of a Stockholm office in September 1994 brought the total number of information offices up to 20.

The Information unit employed a staff of 80 prior to the referendum, of whom 65 were paid out of employment funds. Operations were divided into two parts: the information service and the public service. The information service gathered information, catered to the needs of interest groups, and produced material, while the public service distributed material and responded to questions from the general public.

Finland Information on European Integration also participated in fairs and public events. From June to September 1994, a `Europe Bus' toured the country. Three out of every four municipal libraries set up information desks at a total of 380 branches up and down the country, to which the imfprmation unit regularly sent material. A basic Information Brochure was available at every post office in 1994.

The unit distributed hundreds of various publications to the general public, 90 of them listed on the order form for the unit's basic material. It also produced 40 titles of its own.

The activities of the information unit were organized into three phases. The first was the provision of information at the time of the membership negotiations, from February 1993 to March of the following year. This was followed by a phase of half a year leading up to the referendum, in which a number of new players emerged, the referendum itself being followed by a phase of adjustment. The unit's public service is still operating today.

Marketing efforts and the demand for services

Finland Information for European Integration set a target of 200,000 public service contacts by the date of the referendum. With the exception of one or two fairly small campaigns, commercial marketing began in earnest in June 1994, with the launch of the Europe Bus's marketing tour.

September 1994 saw a number of televised public service ads giving information on the services provided by the information unit. Actors in the popular rural soap opera `Metsolat' appeared in these ads. According to Finnish Gallup, 41% of all viewers had seen the `Metsolat' ads by the end of September, a figure which had risen to 47% by the date of the referendum.

The TV ads were backed up by regional and subject-related advertisements in the press, which also contained the order form for free basic information material.

During the public service's 16 month lifespan, the unit was contacted by a total of 248,000 members of the public, or an average of 15,000 per month. The busiest month was September 1994, when the information service was used by 87,000 people.

Finland Information on Eurepean Integration distributed 1,300,000 copies of its own publications, as well as an additional 750,000 copies of material produced by others, in particular the `yes' and `no' movements.

The questions asked by members of the public can be divided into three main topic categories: enquiries of direct relevance to the questioner's own life, the effects of membership in general, and the activities of the EU. Personally relevant matters such as study or work within the EU remained the most popular topics until February 1994 and the entrance into force of the agreement on the European Economic Area.

From March 1994, the most popular topic was the possible effects of membership on Finland. By this time agreement had been reached in the membership negotiations. Questions related to the integration process attracted the least interest during the life of the public information service, despite an increase in interest following confirmation of Finnish membership.

Finland Information on European Integration kept a record of the ten most frequently asked questions, which in September 1994 were as follows (not in numerical order):

• How much will membership cost?
• Will it cut the price of food?
• What will happen to the price of cars?
• Will there be a deterioration in social security?
• How will it affect the position of women?
• Will Finland have to accept foreign nuclear waste?
• Will Finlands `everyman's rights' be preserved?
• How will it affect Finland's national security?
• Who takes the decisions in the EU?
• Is it possible to withdraw from the EU?

There was no typical customer; on the contrary, the customer group was notably heterogeneous in nature. Both supporters and opponents of membership used the service. If there was a common denominator among the customers, it would be a greater than average interest in the whole EU issue. This suggestion gains support from the considerable fall in demand for the service just prior to the final day of voting in the referendum, following the closure of the advance postal ballot.

An impartial approach

It was clear from the parameters set by the Government that Finland Information on European Integration was not to express any opinion on the desirability of EU membership. The unit's own material contained only factual information. Impartiality was the most important guiding principle running through all the unit's activities, the aim being to present all aspects of the question.

The regional information offices distributed all material which was offered to the information unit and fulfilled the following criteria: the publication dealt with the issue in question, it contained no major factual errors, there was no reason to assume it would lead to any legal consequences (for instance, a suit for defamation of character), and the person or organization responsible for the text was clearly indicated. Only one leaflet was rejected, due to the lack of a signature.

Despite its best efforts, the unit was to some extent criticised for partiality. Criticism came mainly from those opposed to membership. It is nevertheless worth mentioning that the actual leaders of the `no' movement offered no criticism of the unit's activities.

The accusations of partiality arose primarily from the unit's position within the State administration and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Critics presumably assumed as a matter of course - often without even examining the unit's activities - that it was impossible for a unit of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to operate impartially in relation to the EU.

In September and October of 1994, the unit began to respond more often to readers' questions on the letters pages of the press and to correct obviously unfounded claims put forward, mainly by opponents of membership. This was also seen by some as taking sides against those opposed to membership.

In response to the most frequently asked questions and to correct the main unfounded claims, Finland Information on European Integration at this time published fact sheets on the following topics:

• member countries of various European integration organizations;
• Finland's membership contributions;
• taxation;
• prices in Finland;
• social security;
• the position of women;
• euthanasia;
• food additives;
• nuclear waste;
• movement of persons;
• foreign and security policy;
• relations with Russia;
• the EU constitution;
• withdrawal from the EU

The Finnish public information effort was well balanced compared with experiences in Sweden, Norway and Austria, where the authorities refused to distribute material opposed to membership. The public information service nevertheless provided critics with a concrete focus for their general sense of dissatisfaction, even where the real object of their criticism was the power and communication structures of society as a whole.

What was achieved?

How did the referendum affect the various sectors of society and how successful was the public information effort?

I would rate the media, the popular movements, and the State administration as the successful players.

In assessing the role of the media, there are two factors which must be taken into consideration: how they succeeded in their basic role and how the referendum in turn affected this role. Overall, the media were fairly successful in discharging their basic role, although they suffered from the same problem as the rest of society: the novelty and consequent unfamiliarity of the situation. The referendum had the effect of increasing the power of the media, which benefited in a number of ways from the straight choice of `yes' or `no' presented to voters.

The media themselves selected the protagonists for the referendum debates. As a consequence of this, one may now wonder whether television will itself choose the party representatives it likes best for the televised debates prior to the next parliamentary elections. In some cases the media highlighted the low level of public awareness on the issue and attempted to lay the responsibility for this at the door of the information and campaign organizations. But do the media themselves not shoulder the main responsibility for informing the public?

Popular movements were presented with a wonderful opportunity to influence the decision-making process. If referenda were to become more common in Finland, excellent ground would be provided for the growth of ad hoc popular movements independent of the political parties and established interest groups. The simple `yes'/'no' formula, as used in the referendum, favours temporary alliances which cut across established social boundaries.

The referendum strengthened the status of government as a social actor, despite the fact that the referendum as such would be expected to have the opposite effect. After all, actual EU membership both reduces and increases the role of the administration. EU integration tends to increase supranational and regional power at the expense of the nation state, but the way the EU works tends to favour the bureaucracy over democratic decision-making.

The referendum highlighted the problems in the established ways in which power has been wielded in Finnish society. The traditional divisions between the parties and interest groups failed to address the needs and expectations of ordinary members of the public.

It also highlighted a certain problem in marketing communication: advertising professionals in Finland are woefully ill-prepared to design and present a social message. This is scarcely surprising, given the insignificant scale of social marketing in Finland. There needs to be greater input in professional education and an expansion of the recruitment base. In a long run, professional qualifications on marketing communications on social issues can only be raised, however, through an increase in the demand: more social marketing is needed.

The referendum ensured public acceptance of the decision

An overview of the information effort surrounding the referendum reveals the following positive factors: the limited resources were effectively deployed, a broad range of information and opinion was presented, and national unity was preserved. Negative factors include the fragmentary nature of the information, the last-gasp nature of both the supply and the demand for information, and the interpretation of even factual information as opinion in the final weeks immediately prior to the referendum.

The referendum had a number of positive effects. Compared with the normal process of political decision-making, it brought the public more firmly behind the decision. The information distributed during the run-up to polling increased public awareness and enhanced social readiness for internationalization. Finnish democracy was similarly enhanced, as ordinary members of the public became more able and willing to participate in the decision-making process.

Referenda are not conducive to optimally rational political decision-making. However, the side-effects of the referendum were so positive as to justify the original decision to hold it.